4,099 works, 472 books, 3,268 articles, 356 other works, 3 awaiting classification, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
Coal used by a mine is produced but not sold: can it legitimately be deducted twice? In this brief speaking turn from the 1920 Socialization Commission proceedings on coal mining, Emil Lederer asks whether replacing an output-based measure with a sales-based measure has introduced just such an inconsistency into colliery calculations. His concern is not merely arithmetic: the treatment of internal consumption also affects the reported wage share. Rather than declaring an error proved, he requests an explanation of how the deductions can be reconciled. The intervention offers a compact example of scrutinizing economic evidence by asking precisely what a measure already excludes.
Who can judge a mining investment when the firms seeking approval control the technical knowledge needed to assess it? In this brief intervention recorded in the 1920 coal-mining socialization commission proceedings, Emil Lederer challenges Rathenau’s formulation by exposing the dependence of public oversight on private expertise. An interest guarantee, he argues, would cover risks that private investors ordinarily bear themselves without making uncertain costs or outcomes any easier to judge. His objection is especially pointed where the Reich Coal Council can neither confidently approve an investment nor justify rejecting it. The turn offers a concrete glimpse of a difficulty within socialization proposals: public responsibility for financial consequences need not bring public control over the knowledge informing investment decisions.
In this single-sentence intervention in the 1920 coal-mining commission proceedings, Emil Lederer objects to a line of reasoning because it coincides so closely with private interest. The remark offers a compact instance of his scrutiny of an argument’s underlying interests. Without the preceding exchange, the precise claim he contests remains unidentified; what survives is the pointed connection he draws between reasoning and private advantage.
In this single-sentence intervention from the coal-mining commission proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer flags a concrete organizational objection: the arrangement under discussion would entail extensive duplication of administration. The remark preserves his concern with administrative overlap, while leaving the proposal’s details and any preferred alternative outside the extract.
Dann haben wir eine weitgehende doppelte Verwaltung.
English translation: “Then we have extensive duplication of administration.”
In this single recorded question from the 1920 coal-mining socialization commission proceedings, Emil Lederer asks what happens in the reverse case: when the entrepreneur comes forward with the investment. The interest lies in his change of perspective, making entrepreneurial initiative a case the discussion must address. The turn preserves that precise challenge, but neither the preceding argument nor Lederer’s preferred answer.
Aber umgekehrt, wenn der Unternehmer mit der Investition kommt?
English translation: “But conversely, what if the entrepreneur comes forward with the investment?”
“That was the reverse case!” Emil Lederer’s entire recorded interjection in this extract from the coal-mining commission proceedings published in 1920 is a correction to a comparison. Its interest lies in that precise objection: Lederer disputes the direction of the analogy, without offering an alternative account. The fragment preserves a moment of disagreement, but not the preceding claim or the details needed to identify what was reversed. It is evidence of an intervention in debate, not a statement of Lederer’s broader position on coal mining.
What would socialization change if efficient production already brought entrepreneurs a higher rent? In this two-sentence contribution to the coal-mining commission proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer points to a continuity between existing arrangements and the proposed reform. His intervention offers a precise distinction to consider: the economic reward for producing more efficiently is not, by itself, a feature unique to socialization. It records a pointed qualification in the debate, not a developed position for or against socialization.
An arrangement may reorganize coal mining without changing the private entrepreneur’s economic position. In this brief recorded intervention in the German Socialization Commission’s proceedings, published in 1920, Emil Lederer makes that distinction the test of whether the proposed reform deserves the name “socialization.” Lower production costs and a larger share of output for mine administrations can still increase private profit. Lederer does not reject the institutional construction itself; he challenges the political label attached to it. The contribution offers a precise distinction between changing an industry’s organization and changing the economic relationships that determine who benefits.
Nur würde ich der bescheidenen Meinung sein, daß wir das nicht unter der Flagge der Sozialisierung segeln lassen.
English translation: “I would merely be of the modest opinion that we should not sail this under the flag of socialization.”
Where does technical management end and economic authority begin? In this brief intervention in the coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, published in 1920, Emil Lederer refuses to confine technical leadership to installing machinery. He connects the formation of production costs with decisions about prices, while noting that surplus profit from improvements ultimately benefits the enterprise. This single recorded speaking turn offers a precise point of entry into the management question: decisions presented as technical also bear on pricing and the destination of economic gains.
Can production costs guide economic reform when production itself is constrained? In this brief intervention recorded in the coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, published in 1920, Emil Lederer declines a direct reply to Dr. Rathenau and instead restates a distinction between limited or reduced production and normal production. His objection is precise: where productive capacity is restricted, an approach based on production costs will leave the existing economic system unchanged. The turn offers no alternative programme; its interest lies in the condition Lederer insists reformers must confront before their calculations can promise institutional change.
If coal prices are based on production costs, what incentive remains to lower those costs? In this brief recorded intervention in the German Socialization Commission’s coal-mining deliberations, published in 1920, Emil Lederer challenges a proposed plan at precisely this point. His objection is not merely to a mechanical pricing rule: he doubts that cumbersome oversight can later repair the incentive it removes. The speaking turn offers a compact example of institutional criticism, asking readers to distinguish between a rule that accommodates existing costs and one that encourages producers to reduce them.
A compensation settlement may fix a capital value, but what happens when repayment stretches over decades? In this brief intervention in the 1920 coal-mining socialization commission proceedings, Emil Lederer asks Dr. Rathenau to clarify valuation principles, the timetable for repayment and continued private operation, and the effects of monetary and technological change. His perspective is practical and questioning: entrepreneurs need a definite horizon to plan, yet the value underlying a settlement may shift before that horizon is reached. The recorded turn offers no formula or preferred timetable; it pinpoints the tension between planning certainty and changing economic conditions within a proposed transition from private operation.