4,099 works, 472 books, 3,268 articles, 356 other works, 3 awaiting classification, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
Can a premium for economical coal production overcome a pricing system that rewards higher costs? In this brief intervention in the German Socialization Commission’s proceedings, published in 1920, Emil Lederer asks for a practical calculation rather than accepting the proposed incentive on principle. He also questions whether apparent gains in an enterprise combining mining and further processing amount merely to an accounting shift between its branches. His test is concrete: the premium must outweigh the incentive to raise costs without disregarding consumers’ interests. The contribution lets readers see Lederer scrutinizing regulation through the interaction of accounting, incentives and prices—and questioning whether safeguards shaped by wartime conditions remain necessary under normal circumstances.
Der Anreiz der Prämie muß größer sein, als der Anreiz, die Selbstkosten zu steigern.
English translation: “The incentive provided by the premium must be greater than the incentive to increase production costs.”
If profits are calculated in proportion to production costs, rising costs need not squeeze profits: they may increase them. In this brief intervention in the coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer points to that consequence of the pricing method under discussion. His objection is explicitly conditional: the relationship would hold over the long run only while that method remained feasible. This single recorded speaking turn offers a compact insight into how a pricing rule can make higher costs a basis for higher profits rather than a burden on them.
What is the scale of the amount under discussion? In this single interjection recorded in the coal-mining commission proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer asks whether it is ten times the share capital. The question offers a precise glimpse of his effort to clarify a financial comparison—not evidence of endorsement or opposition. Its interest lies in that distinction, while the amount’s referent remains outside this extract.
(Lederer: Das Zehnfache des Aktienkapitals?)
English translation: “(Lederer: Ten times the share capital?)”
Automatic reimbursement of mining costs may reward the very increases it is meant to cover. In this brief intervention recorded in the coal-mining socialization commission’s 1920 proceedings, Emil Lederer objects that rising production costs can increase profitability when every cost is reimbursed. His demand for a governing formula, left unspecified here, pinpoints a practical tension: covering expenditure is not the same as establishing a defensible rule for payment.
A small ambiguity in coal pricing is the focus of Emil Lederer’s brief intervention in the Socialization Commission’s proceedings published in 1920: are sales surcharges necessarily percentage-based when the provision leaves their determination to the Reich Coal Council under “principles to be established”? Lederer acknowledges that wording but regards a different interpretation as scarcely conceivable. This short speaking turn offers a precise glimpse of the gap between what a provision explicitly states and what a participant assumes it must mean in practice.
Industrial ambition might support coal regulation—or turn against it. In this brief intervention in the German Socialization Commission’s proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer questions whether firms’ conduct under exceptional circumstances can be expected to persist under ordinary conditions. He asks how a markup over production costs would affect their incentive to reduce costs, without assuming ill intent. Responding to Rathenau’s appeal to industrial ambition, he raises a sharper possibility: under the proposed regulation, firms might redirect that ambition toward demonstrating the scheme’s irrationality. The turn offers a compact example of Lederer testing institutional design against the financial incentives and psychological responses it could provoke.
Who should decide whether a loan opens the way to co-ownership—the enterprise receiving it or the Reich Coal Council granting it? In this brief speaking turn from the 1920 coal-mining socialization proceedings, Emil Lederer asks whether that choice should rest with the Council. His concern is a precise adjustment within the proposal under discussion, not a competing programme: lending discretion should allow the Council to decide whether to take on the associated co-ownership position. The question offers a compact glimpse of how the allocation of a single decision could affect control within a socialization scheme, although the options behind Lederer’s reference to a “second possibility” are not specified in this turn.
Does public investment have an independent scope, or only a role where private capital hesitates? In this single-sentence intervention in the coal-mining commission proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer tests another participant’s formulation: it would leave the state a choice only in investments that entrepreneurs or the capital market are reluctant to undertake. His conditional phrasing identifies a restriction rather than endorsing it. The turn offers a precise glimpse of how the terms of a proposal can narrow public discretion without explicitly ruling it out.
How long must exceptional coal-market conditions last to justify the proposed form of regulation? In this brief intervention recorded in the 1920 proceedings of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer presses that question without offering a forecast of his own. He contrasts Vogelstein’s expectation of relatively early normalization, based on conversations with members of the Reich Coal Council, with Rathenau’s expectation of prolonged disruption. If Vogelstein’s account holds, Lederer suggests, it could count against the regulatory arrangement under discussion—but first its evidential basis must be established. This short exchange offers a precise instance of policy scrutiny: Lederer tests not merely what others expect, but whether their expectations are sound enough to support an institutional decision.
A buyout paid through annuities over thirty or forty years: this is the proposal Emil Lederer singles out in his brief recorded intervention in the 1920 coal-mining socialization proceedings. Welcoming the discussion’s turn toward questions of principle, he treats the financing arrangement as a matter for fundamental debate, not merely administrative detail. The speaking turn stops before he endorses or challenges the proposal. Its interest lies in that precise opening: readers encounter the terms on which socialization was being discussed, while seeing the distinction between a proposal Lederer reports and a position he has yet to state.
An exchange needs someone willing to receive what changes hands. In this single interjection from the official coal-mining commission proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer presents that requirement as Dr. Hilferding’s point. The remark offers a compact glimpse of clarification within a live deliberation: calling a transaction an exchange does not settle the question of its recipient. It neither identifies the object exchanged nor establishes Lederer’s own agreement with Hilferding.
Where does the inflationary effect of a coal-mining financing proposal arise? In this brief intervention recorded in the Socialization Commission’s 1920 proceedings, Emil Lederer locates it in the price increases intended to fund repayment. He contrasts that mechanism with full socialization, which, as he puts it, converts shares into bonds. The distinction offers a precise glimpse of his economic reasoning: the issue is how repayment is financed, not a general objection to socialization.
In den Preiserhöhungen erblicke ich die inflationistische Wirkung.
English translation: “I see the inflationary effect in the price increases.”