4,099 works, 472 books, 3,268 articles, 356 other works, 3 awaiting classification, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
Where should a coal-sector organization end when mining, coking and chemical production are intertwined? In this brief intervention recorded in the 1920 socialization commission proceedings, Emil Lederer clarifies his group’s proposal rather than offering a general theory of socialization. He accepts that industrial boundaries are partly arbitrary, yet distinguishes the recovery of chemical raw materials from their further processing: the former belongs within the proposed coal organization, the latter does not. His explanation of the qualification “im Werk” likewise seeks to prevent compulsory inclusion of municipal coking unconnected with mining. The passage offers a precise glimpse of institutional boundary-making, where a few words determine which connected activities a proposal would encompass.
What counts as an economic purpose? In this single-sentence reply recorded in the 1920 coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer makes the question concrete through the sale of gas. His conditional phrasing clarifies a possible meaning of “economic activity” without fixing its definition. The fragment offers a precise glimpse of terminology being negotiated in discussion, rather than a statement of Lederer’s broader position.
Where should a regulatory decision be made—in the law itself or in its implementing provisions? In this brief intervention recorded in the 1920 coal-mining commission proceedings, Emil Lederer proposes loose coordination if substantial quantities are involved, while leaving its definition to implementing provisions. The extract does not identify the precise issue under discussion, and Lederer admits that he cannot recall the commission’s earlier position. Its interest lies in this narrow, practical distinction: a perceived need for coordination need not entail specifying the arrangement in statute.
Where should coking belong when coal mining and iron and steel production are reorganized? In this brief intervention recorded in the 1920 Socialization Commission proceedings, Emil Lederer identifies a concrete consequence of the proposal under discussion: coking operations would be detached from iron and steel works and transferred to the coal community. Wissell’s interjected question prompts an explicit confirmation. The exchange lets readers see precisely where Lederer draws the proposed institutional boundary through an integrated industrial process.
Agreement on the best economic use of coal does not settle how to organize it. In this brief speaking turn from the 1920 Socialization Commission proceedings, Emil Lederer locates the disagreement with von Siemens in the proposed organization’s capacity to achieve a shared objective. He then identifies von Siemens’s concern that organized control of coal itself threatens that objective. The intervention offers a precise distinction between agreement on ends and disagreement over institutional means—not a detailed organizational proposal or a developed rebuttal.
Does organized coordination of coal production necessarily sacrifice economic flexibility? In this brief intervention in the German Socialization Commission’s proceedings, published in 1920, Emil Lederer argues that it need not. He maintains that industry’s links with the proposed coal association could be arranged to secure the same economic advantages as Rathenau’s proposal. The statement offers no detailed institutional design; its interest lies in Lederer’s refusal to treat organization and flexibility as opposites. It isolates a concrete point of contention in the coal debate: whether economic advantages depend on a particular proposal or can also be achieved through a differently organized relationship between industry and the coal association.
In this brief speaking turn from the coal-mining socialization commission proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer reads a proposed § 2 rather than advancing an argument of his own. The provision gives the German Coal Community public-law status and responsibility for administering coal mining in the common economic interest. Its authority over imports and exports remains subject to rules issued by the competent authorities. The passage offers a compact view of the institutional wording under discussion: broad responsibility for an industry, framed within existing governmental regulation.
In this single recorded intervention from the coal-mining socialization commission’s proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer qualifies his assent: general export and import regulations must be taken into account. The documentary interest lies in that qualification, which connects the matter under discussion to the wider rules governing cross-border trade. Since the preceding question is not included, the sentence preserves a condition on his agreement without identifying the specific proposal he supported.
Ja, unter Berücksichtigung der allgemeinen Aus- und Einfuhrbestimmungen.
English translation: “Yes, taking into account the general export and import regulations.”
A proposed interim declaration leads Emil Lederer to a constitutional difficulty in this brief speaking turn from the 1920 coal-mining socialization commission proceedings. With publication of the law not imminent, he urges the commission to state that the redemption of regalian mining rights should be settled through Reich legislation, because it materially affects mining socialization. Yet he immediately qualifies the proposal: as far as he can see, it would entail a constitutional amendment. The interest lies in this precise hesitation—a concrete instance of a socialization measure confronting the legal authority required to carry it out.
Independent financial management need not mean unrestricted control over surpluses. In this brief recorded intervention in the 1920 coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialisation Commission, Emil Lederer reads proposed wording that places these two questions on different footings. The German Coal Community would manage its property affairs independently, except where powers were expressly reserved to the Reich; its surpluses, however, would support production—especially the coal economy—in agreement with the Reich government. These two sentences offer a precise glimpse of institutional design: autonomy in administration coupled with public coordination over the use of surplus funds, without further explanation of how that arrangement would operate.
“That comes later”: Emil Lederer’s complete recorded speaking turn in this extract from the coal-mining deliberations of Germany’s Socialization Commission consists of a single deferral. Its interest is procedural rather than argumentative: it shows Lederer placing an unspecified matter later in the discussion. The remark offers a small trace of the deliberations’ sequencing, but identifies neither the matter deferred nor Lederer’s substantive position on it.
In this single-sentence intervention recorded in the 1920 coal-mining commission proceedings, Emil Lederer draws a precise boundary between the Kohlengemeinschaft and the Reich’s fiscal authority. He treats it as self-evident that the coal community cannot prevent the Reich from imposing a coal tax. The brief turn offers a concrete point of reference for readers tracing how institutional arrangements for coal were distinguished from national taxing powers, without addressing whether such a tax was desirable or how it should be designed.