4,099 works, 472 books, 3,268 articles, 356 other works, 3 awaiting classification, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
In this single-sentence intervention recorded in the 1920 coal-mining commission proceedings, Emil Lederer corrects a financial classification: the instrument under discussion is not money but a bond. Its interest lies in that precise distinction between money and a debt security. The surviving turn names neither the instrument nor the policy consequences, allowing readers to encounter Lederer’s correction without mistaking it for a developed argument about coal-mining socialization.
Das ist kein Geld, sondern eine Obligation.
English translation: “That is not money, but a bond.”
Can liability shared by an entire industry offer security comparable to that of the state? In this brief intervention recorded in the 1920 coal-mining socialization commission proceedings, Emil Lederer maintains that making the whole German coal-mining industry liable for a bond debt would provide the greatest security imaginable. His distinctive emphasis falls on sector-wide liability rather than Reich backing. Although the extract leaves the precise arrangement and its beneficiaries unspecified, it gives readers a compact example of how financial security was argued for within the commission: through the breadth of the obligation, not simply the identity of a state guarantor.
Does a compulsory purchase necessarily leave its buyer uncompensated? In this brief recorded intervention in the coal-mining socialization commission’s deliberations, Emil Lederer distinguishes the coercion imposed on mine owners from the asset they receive. Coal-community bonds, he insists, are realizable property backed by the industry, not merely evidence of money surrendered. Their value therefore constitutes compensation, even though the purchase is compulsory. The interest of this small documentary source lies in that precise distinction: Lederer redirects the discussion from the fact of compulsion to what changes hands, without settling how the bonds should be valued.
For Emil Lederer, the threat of collapse is an incentive to economic discipline. In this single-sentence intervention recorded in the coal-mining commission proceedings published in 1920, he argues that rejecting a state guarantee puts the strongest pressure on the coal association to operate economically: deficits would immediately threaten its survival. The brief statement isolates a concrete tension in institutional design—financial protection versus pressure to avoid losses—without explaining how that pressure would work in practice.
In this single recorded intervention in the 1920 coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer challenges a point’s novelty by referring to the previous year’s report. His brief remark shows a precise debating move: appealing to an existing documentary record rather than advancing a new argument. Neither the report nor the point at issue is identified within the extract, so its interest lies in this local appeal to precedent, not in a recoverable position on coal policy.
Das geht auch aus dem vorjährigen Bericht hervor; das ist nichts Neues.
English translation: “That also emerges from last year's report; that is nothing new.”
Who should set coal prices when only part of the economy has been socialized? In this brief intervention in the German Socialization Commission’s deliberations, Emil Lederer defends government price-setting as a provisional arrangement, not a permanent model. His objection to transferring that power to the Reich Economic Council is concrete: seats won by particular groups do not necessarily reflect their stake in coal, and even fair representation of general economic importance would miss industries’ differing dependence on it. The contribution sharpens a practical dilemma of institutional design: a body representing existing interests may be ill-suited to govern an economy whose transformation is precisely the aim.
Socializing coal production does not settle who should oversee it—or how freely its prices can be set. In this brief intervention recorded in the 1920 coal socialization commission proceedings, Emil Lederer questions why proposals from a council selected for coal expertise should pass through a less knowledgeable economic council rather than the people’s overall representative authority. He regards government itself as the apex of democratic self-administration, not an authority imposed from above. Yet institutional reform cannot abolish economic constraints: coal must neither become a source of unlimited fiscal extraction nor operate at a loss. This compact exchange shows how Lederer connects specialist knowledge with democratic accountability while insisting that export competitiveness limits the state’s pricing discretion.
How could a proposed coal company honour existing debts while financing new installations and miners’ housing? In this brief intervention recorded in the 1920 Sozialisierungskommission proceedings, Emil Lederer answers von Siemens by separating legal obligations from their measurable economic burden. Before judging the cost of inherited bonds, he argues, the commission needs to know their scale. For new investment beyond the capacity of private capital, he considers a limited state guarantee of interest—not direct state financing. His proposals remain explicitly provisional. The turn offers a compact view of institutional design in progress: creditor security, investment needs and public guarantees must be distinguished before deciding which transitional arrangements belong in law.
An institution’s powers can be defined by what it must not do. In this brief intervention recorded in the coal-mining commission proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer explains why the draft addresses the Reich Coal Council’s role in employment relations while denying it authority to intervene. Management and representatives of workers and salaried employees are to handle those matters; the council merely takes note of their agreements. His phrase “negative competence” captures the distinction. The passage offers a precise glimpse of legislative boundary-setting: naming a sphere of activity need not confer control over it.
Before assigning decision-making powers, should one first establish what committees are meant to do? In this brief intervention recorded in the 1920 coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialisation Commission, Emil Lederer treats the boundary between committee autonomy and Reich Coal Council participation as a possible matter for the council’s rules of procedure. He proposes no fixed division of powers; instead, he identifies the missing prerequisite for deciding one. The speaking turn offers a precise glimpse of institutional design in discussion: authority cannot readily be allocated while responsibilities remain undefined.
Delegating a decision need not mean making it final. In this brief intervention recorded in the 1920 coal-mining commission proceedings, Emil Lederer supplies a procedural clause allowing affected parties to object to decisions by Reich Coal Council committees. The Council’s rules would specify when that right applied. His concern is precise: committee authority must remain open to challenge. The passage offers a concrete glimpse of how an institutional safeguard takes shape through a small correction to proposed wording, rather than through a general declaration about coal policy.
Who should draw the boundaries of coal-mining districts? In this brief intervention recorded in the Socialization Commission’s proceedings published in 1920, Emil Lederer proposes retaining a provision that gives the Reich Coal Directorate the initiative and the Reich Coal Council the authority to determine the districts. His clarification makes the territorial scope explicit: the division of the entire mining sector into large districts. The passage offers a compact documentary instance of institutional design, distinguishing the power to propose boundaries from the power to establish them.