4,249 works (including 483 books, 3,406 articles and 357 historical documents), 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable.
Does retaining an existing organization of milk supply also mean operating it as a monopoly? In this brief question recorded in the Sozialisierungs-Kommission proceedings published in 1921, Emil Lederer asks that the institutional consequence be made explicit. His intervention distinguishes continuity of organization from monopoly operation without endorsing or rejecting either. The interest of this small documentary source lies in that precise distinction: it lets readers see what Lederer sought to clarify, while leaving the answer outside the recorded turn.
How can municipalization be subject to legal challenge without becoming trapped in prolonged litigation? In this brief intervention recorded in the Sozialisierungs-Kommission proceedings published in 1921, Emil Lederer proposes limiting administrative review to two judicial instances while allowing challenges from municipal representatives, the affected entrepreneur, and workers’ statutory representatives. His distinctive point is that council members should act as advocates of public welfare, rather than leaving litigation solely to the proprietor whose interests are at stake. The passage offers a concrete glimpse of how procedural rules—who may sue, within what deadline, and with what suspensive effect—could reconcile timely municipal action with scrutiny of its legal conditions.
In this single recorded intervention in the Socialisation Commission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer connects compulsory organisation with municipal power to block the establishment of new enterprises. He proposes an immediate compulsory association as a preparatory measure, rather than an end in itself. The statement offers a precise glimpse of a proposed mechanism for municipal control, while leaving the particular case and its wider justification unstated.
A softened clause is not necessarily an agreed clause. In this brief intervention in the Socialisation Commission’s proceedings, published in 1921, Emil Lederer objects that revised wording on demolition value still fails to resolve his group’s reservations. His proposal is precise: retain the shared general provisions, but record the disputed clause only in the other group’s version. Rather than explaining how demolition value should be calculated, this speaking turn shows Lederer insisting that the commission’s text distinguish common ground from continuing disagreement.
In this single-sentence intervention recorded in the Sozialisierungs-Kommission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer judges § 20 sufficient. The statement documents a definite position on the adequacy of a statutory provision, but supplies neither its subject matter nor his reasons. Its value lies in that precise, limited evidence: a recorded judgement, not an elaborated argument.
Ich halte den § 20 für ausreichend.
English translation: “I consider § 20 sufficient.”
Municipal authority to organize an enterprise and its power to exclude private competitors meet in this brief intervention by Emil Lederer, recorded in the Sozialisierungs-Kommission proceedings published in 1921. Qualifying rather than dismissing Wissell’s reservations, Lederer points to a municipality’s ability to form a compulsory association (Zwangsverband). The provision under discussion, he notes, permits a ban on establishing similar private enterprises to secure that association’s exclusive operation. This compact speaking turn offers a precise glimpse of the legal mechanism at issue: municipal organization backed by restrictions on new private competition, presented as a partial answer to objections rather than a fully developed programme.
In this single-sentence intervention recorded in the Sozialisierungs-Kommission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer maintains his preference for the existing wording of § 3. The phrase “still prefer” registers persistence within an ongoing debate, but gives neither his reasons nor the competing formulation. This brief source establishes his stated position without explaining the provision or the disagreement.
Ich gebe der bisherigen Fassung von § 3 immer noch den Vorzug.
English translation: “I still prefer the existing wording of § 3.”
Should a municipality compensate an enterprise’s owners as though the business were dismantled, even when dismantling would be economically harmful? In this brief recorded commission intervention, Emil Lederer objects to wording that could turn an exceptional liquidation value into a routine claim for higher compensation. Machinery and buildings made costly by the housing shortage give his objection concrete force. He also questions the imbalance of statutory safeguards: why protect owners without protecting the municipalities taking over their enterprises? His proposed middle course makes the enterprise’s unity a guideline for judges. The intervention shows how a seemingly technical valuation rule can distribute costs between private owners and public bodies.
Ich würde es als gangbaren Mittelweg ansehen, wenn die Einheit des Unternehmens für den Richter als Richtlinie festgelegt würde.
English translation: “I would regard it as a workable middle course if the unity of the enterprise were established as a guideline for the judge.”
What counts as the object of compensation when an enterprise is municipalized? In this brief intervention recorded in the Socialization Commission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer takes the enterprise as a whole, rather than its liquidation value or asset value, as the proper basis. His statement offers no valuation procedure; its interest lies in the distinction between identifying what is to be compensated and assigning it a monetary value. This small documentary source captures that distinction in a single, sharply bounded contribution to the commission’s deliberations.
Who should exercise decision-making authority, and how narrowly should it be defined? In this brief intervention recorded in the Sozialisierungs-Kommission proceedings, Emil Lederer turns competing institutional proposals into four positions for a vote. He distinguishes delegation to subordinate state authorities from delegation to the Reich Economic Council commission, and separates retaining the Reich government’s authority from restricting it to general decisions. His role here is procedural, not advocacy: the passage lets readers observe how differences over jurisdiction become explicit voting alternatives, without supplying either the content of § 1 or the vote’s outcome.
Can territorial uniformity justify requiring both Reich and state approval for municipalization when the proposed rules already allow municipalities to choose differently? In this brief recorded commission intervention, Emil Lederer tests that justification against a concrete comparison: municipal control of the food trade in Berlin but not Potsdam. He sees no economic disadvantage in such variation and extends the reasoning to Saxony and Bavaria. His objection to cumulative approval is pointed: either level of government could block the other, preserving precisely the unevenness the requirement is meant to prevent. The passage offers a compact example of Lederer distinguishing economic harm from political difference—and exposing how an administrative safeguard could become an instrument of obstruction.
Who can approve municipalization when a municipality lacks the power to undertake it itself? In this single-sentence intervention recorded in the Sozialisierungskommission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer makes the authorizing authority—not the merits of municipalization—the issue requiring attention. He names no approving body and offers no procedure. The brief contribution isolates a precise institutional distinction: a municipality’s own competence is separate from the power to authorize its action.