4,249 works (including 483 books, 3,406 articles and 357 historical documents), 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable.
A statutory limit on expropriation could be undermined by either a special municipal authorization or a general government decision. In this brief intervention recorded in the Sozialisierungs-Kommission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer identifies both routes and asks how §§ 2 and 3 should be worded to exclude them. His focus is the fit between legislative intention and administrative powers: if the commission intends the restriction concerning cultural enterprises to apply also to agriculture and forestry, the wording must secure that coverage in both sections. The passage offers a compact example of legislative scrutiny at the point where a stated restriction must become an enforceable rule, without proposing a finished draft.
Must a municipality run an economic sector itself before it can exclude private competitors? In this brief intervention recorded in the Socialization Commission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer explains proposed statutory wording that separates municipal monopoly powers from direct municipal operation. His focus is the breadth of organizational choice: even a planned compulsory association, loosely organized and concerned only with posting prices or setting rules for members, could justify barring comparable private enterprises. The passage makes a precise legislative tension visible: greater freedom for municipalities to choose how a sector is organized could mean less freedom for private firms to enter it or continue operating.
Would factory-scale baking actually make bread supply cheaper? In this brief intervention recorded in the Socialisation Commission’s deliberations, Emil Lederer asks for an expert report comparing large and small bakeries and estimating the savings technically achievable through factory production. His qualification—superiority only “if it exists”—keeps the proposed advantage open to investigation. The passage offers a precise glimpse of Lederer’s demand for evidence at this moment: rather than endorse a production model, he asks practising technicians to establish whether its promised economies are real and how large they might be.
How precisely should legislation prescribe the rules for closing enterprises? In this single recorded question from the Sozialisierungs-Kommission proceedings, Emil Lederer asks Privy Councillor Schäffer whether the law will specify them exhaustively or offer only general directives. His intervention isolates a concrete choice in legislative design: how much the statute itself should determine. Neither an endorsement nor a developed argument, it lets readers see exactly what Lederer sought to clarify; Schäffer’s answer lies outside this extract.
Who buys the bread matters in Emil Lederer’s brief intervention in the Socialisation Commission’s deliberations. Challenging the representativeness of cases raised in discussion, he argues that cooperative bakeries ordinarily sell overwhelmingly to members of the consumer cooperative. His qualification—“to my knowledge”—keeps the objection measured. This recorded speaking turn offers a precise distinction between exceptional cases and customary practice, showing how the identity of customers can become a point of contention in discussions of cooperative enterprise.
Should discussion of how to supply the population with food also address financing? In this brief procedural intervention recorded in the Socialization Commission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer recommends keeping the questions separate. His concern is the organization of deliberation, not a particular financial policy: technical suitability should be considered without joining it to the financial question. The interest of this small documentary source lies in that precise distinction—and in the restraint of a recommendation offered without an accompanying justification.
A cinema could turn its audience into a consumer cooperative by offering membership discounts—and thereby escape municipalization. This possibility sharpens Emil Lederer’s brief intervention in the Socialization Commission proceedings published in 1921: how can legislation protect genuine cooperatives without making their legal form a shelter for businesses resisting public control? Lederer approaches the problem as a defender of both cooperative development and municipal provision. He refuses to treat wartime failures in food administration as decisive evidence against municipal enterprise under normal conditions. His closing question, left unanswered here, makes the passage worth examining: it shows how an apparently protective exemption can undermine the purpose of a law, and why institutional names alone cannot settle which enterprises deserve protection.
Municipal ownership need not mean censorship: this distinction anchors Emil Lederer’s brief recorded intervention in the Sozialisierungs-Kommission proceedings published in 1921. Explaining his support for Dr. Vogelstein’s motion, Lederer argues that municipalities can establish cultural enterprises where management is inadequate or profit interests threaten cultural interests. His decisive point is practical rather than programmatic: no law prevents such initiatives. The passage offers a compact view of his reasoning about public responsibility for culture, without specifying how municipal management would work.
Der Sinn der Kommunalisierung soll nicht der einer Zensur sein, sondern es soll sein eine Übernahme durch die Gemeinde.
English translation: “The purpose of municipalization should not be censorship, but rather a takeover by the municipality.”
A cooperative that bakes bread is not necessarily a producers’ cooperative. In this brief intervention recorded in the Socialization Commission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer challenges the habit of treating consumer and producer cooperatives alike. His correction of Wissell’s example turns on whom the cooperative organizes, not simply what it does. The remark offers a compact distinction with practical consequences for discussions of municipalization: productive activity alone does not determine a cooperative’s classification.
Membership is the point of comparison in Emil Lederer’s brief intervention in the Sozialisierungs-Kommission proceedings. He asks whether consumer organization differs fundamentally from the cooperative association of independent tradespeople, then notes how carefully a credit cooperative scrutinizes those it admits. This complete recorded speaking turn offers a compact question rather than a developed argument: should cooperative forms be treated alike when their approaches to membership differ?
Could a shoemaking business fall outside socialization simply by taking cooperative form? In this brief recorded intervention in the German Socialization Commission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer draws attention to the experts’ unanimous view that producer cooperatives should count as non-commercial and therefore be exempt. His example makes the consequence tangible: shoemakers could place not only leather purchasing but also business operations and shoe sales within a cooperative, thereby excluding the enterprise from socialization under the experts’ interpretation. The interest of this compact source lies in Lederer’s shift from an organizational label to the activities it encompasses. Without proposing an alternative, he pinpoints a boundary problem in deciding which enterprises socialization should reach.
Collective control can expand without simply restoring communal ownership: this is the tension Eugen Peter Schwiedland brings into view in his brief review of Waldemar Mitscherlich’s economic stage theory. He presents Mitscherlich’s account largely through exposition rather than criticism, tracing how private initiative emerges from customary restraints and then encounters new forms of corporate authority. The concrete interest lies in the final stage, where state factories, trusts, trade unions, shop stewards and works councils all figure within an enlarged concept of “corporative” economy. Readers can discover how this scheme distinguishes renewed collective power over developed capitalist enterprises from the communal regulation of early economic life—and how cautiously the review describes its possible movement toward “social capital.”