4,099 works, 472 books, 3,268 articles, 356 other works, 3 awaiting classification, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
In this single-sentence intervention recorded in the Sozialisierungs-Kommission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer judges § 20 sufficient. The statement documents a definite position on the adequacy of a statutory provision, but supplies neither its subject matter nor his reasons. Its value lies in that precise, limited evidence: a recorded judgement, not an elaborated argument.
Ich halte den § 20 für ausreichend.
English translation: “I consider § 20 sufficient.”
Municipal authority to organize an enterprise and its power to exclude private competitors meet in this brief intervention by Emil Lederer, recorded in the Sozialisierungs-Kommission proceedings published in 1921. Qualifying rather than dismissing Wissell’s reservations, Lederer points to a municipality’s ability to form a compulsory association (Zwangsverband). The provision under discussion, he notes, permits a ban on establishing similar private enterprises to secure that association’s exclusive operation. This compact speaking turn offers a precise glimpse of the legal mechanism at issue: municipal organization backed by restrictions on new private competition, presented as a partial answer to objections rather than a fully developed programme.
In this single-sentence intervention recorded in the Sozialisierungs-Kommission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer maintains his preference for the existing wording of § 3. The phrase “still prefer” registers persistence within an ongoing debate, but gives neither his reasons nor the competing formulation. This brief source establishes his stated position without explaining the provision or the disagreement.
Ich gebe der bisherigen Fassung von § 3 immer noch den Vorzug.
English translation: “I still prefer the existing wording of § 3.”
Should a municipality compensate an enterprise’s owners as though the business were dismantled, even when dismantling would be economically harmful? In this brief recorded commission intervention, Emil Lederer objects to wording that could turn an exceptional liquidation value into a routine claim for higher compensation. Machinery and buildings made costly by the housing shortage give his objection concrete force. He also questions the imbalance of statutory safeguards: why protect owners without protecting the municipalities taking over their enterprises? His proposed middle course makes the enterprise’s unity a guideline for judges. The intervention shows how a seemingly technical valuation rule can distribute costs between private owners and public bodies.
Ich würde es als gangbaren Mittelweg ansehen, wenn die Einheit des Unternehmens für den Richter als Richtlinie festgelegt würde.
English translation: “I would regard it as a workable middle course if the unity of the enterprise were established as a guideline for the judge.”
What counts as the object of compensation when an enterprise is municipalized? In this brief intervention recorded in the Socialization Commission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer takes the enterprise as a whole, rather than its liquidation value or asset value, as the proper basis. His statement offers no valuation procedure; its interest lies in the distinction between identifying what is to be compensated and assigning it a monetary value. This small documentary source captures that distinction in a single, sharply bounded contribution to the commission’s deliberations.
Who should exercise decision-making authority, and how narrowly should it be defined? In this brief intervention recorded in the Sozialisierungs-Kommission proceedings, Emil Lederer turns competing institutional proposals into four positions for a vote. He distinguishes delegation to subordinate state authorities from delegation to the Reich Economic Council commission, and separates retaining the Reich government’s authority from restricting it to general decisions. His role here is procedural, not advocacy: the passage lets readers observe how differences over jurisdiction become explicit voting alternatives, without supplying either the content of § 1 or the vote’s outcome.
Can territorial uniformity justify requiring both Reich and state approval for municipalization when the proposed rules already allow municipalities to choose differently? In this brief recorded commission intervention, Emil Lederer tests that justification against a concrete comparison: municipal control of the food trade in Berlin but not Potsdam. He sees no economic disadvantage in such variation and extends the reasoning to Saxony and Bavaria. His objection to cumulative approval is pointed: either level of government could block the other, preserving precisely the unevenness the requirement is meant to prevent. The passage offers a compact example of Lederer distinguishing economic harm from political difference—and exposing how an administrative safeguard could become an instrument of obstruction.
Who can approve municipalization when a municipality lacks the power to undertake it itself? In this single-sentence intervention recorded in the Sozialisierungskommission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer makes the authorizing authority—not the merits of municipalization—the issue requiring attention. He names no approving body and offers no procedure. The brief contribution isolates a precise institutional distinction: a municipality’s own competence is separate from the power to authorize its action.
Does greater freedom for economic forces promise more efficient potash mining within existing corporate groups, or does it presuppose their consolidation? In this brief question recorded in the Socialisation Commission proceedings published in 1921, Emil Lederer asks a participant to clarify precisely that distinction. He neither endorses mergers nor accepts the promised efficiency gain as established. The interest of this small documentary source lies in his insistence on specifying the industrial structure behind an abstract claim about economic optimisation: what, exactly, would have to change for the proposed improvement to occur?
Can findings about agricultural productivity be applied equally to every crop? In this brief intervention, recorded in the 1921 proceedings of the Sozialisierungs-Kommission on the potash economy, Emil Lederer asks Professor Gerlach to clarify the reach of observations that had surprised the commission. His question connects a technical uncertainty with an economic one: would an anticipated shift toward different crops alter productive capacity and, consequently, sales? The turn preserves neither Gerlach’s findings nor his reply. Its interest lies in Lederer’s precise challenge to generalization, showing how changing cultivation patterns could complicate an assessment of the potash market.
Foreign competition might justify public control of potash production while making public management of its export trade more difficult. This tension gives Emil Lederer’s recorded commission intervention its distinctive focus. Rather than treating socialization as an end in itself, he asks whether it could close inefficient plants and redistribute production quotas more effectively than competing private industrial groups. Conflicting estimates of the necessary closures leave that advantage unproven; the demands of overseas selling introduce a different set of risks. Lederer considers separating publicly organized production from private marketing, but withholds a definitive recommendation. This brief contribution offers a concrete view of institutional choices tested against costs, commercial knowledge, and the unresolved question of who would bear losses.
What would justify full socialization of the potash industry? In this brief speaking turn from the Socialization Commission’s proceedings, published in 1921, Emil Lederer proposes a concrete test: whether private corporate structures prevent economically necessary consolidation and transfers of production quotas. His case remains conditional, turning on what private enterprise can actually accomplish rather than an assumed necessity for public ownership. He also separates two risks easily conflated in debate: losing the power to dictate export prices and being unable to sell output at all. The costs of establishing Alsatian production and distribution temper his fears of foreign competition. This compact intervention offers a precise view of Lederer weighing institutional obstacles against market pressures while acknowledging the limits of the available evidence.