4,099 works, 472 books, 3,268 articles, 356 other works, 3 awaiting classification, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
What would actually set legislation in motion? In this single recorded intervention in the Socialization Commission’s deliberations on municipalization, Emil Lederer locates the practical impetus in requests from municipalities. Opposing an unspecified addition, he endorses Hilferding’s reason: such requests would be the only effective force driving legislation forward. The remark offers a narrowly focused glimpse of Lederer’s concern with the source of legislative initiative, while leaving the precise amendment and wider dispute unresolved.
Exempting cooperatives from municipalization need not mean excluding them from municipal enterprise. In this brief intervention recorded in the Socialization Commission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer proposes allowing municipalities to entrust monopoly operations to cooperatives. He treats exemption as the lesser harm: small consumer cooperatives may fragment competition, but leaving large cooperatives exposed to uncertain municipal takeover carries its own costs. His practical scrutiny also reaches the Reich government’s authority. A municipality could, he argues, establish a bakery and municipalize private competitors with support from the constituent state’s central authority, bypassing a Reich government decision. The contribution offers a compact example of legislative reasoning attentive to the gap between formal safeguards and available administrative routes.
Should compensation for municipalization reflect what an undertaking might fetch if sold off or dismantled, even when its owners would otherwise keep it running? In this brief intervention recorded in the Sozialisierungs-Kommission proceedings published in 1921, Emil Lederer questions the practical basis of granting the highest possible value. Reading von Batocki’s motion as an elaboration of Schmalenbach’s position, he tests the dismantling scenario against entrepreneurs’ actual conduct and what they would likely do without municipalization. He offers no alternative valuation formula, but identifies a precise point of dispute: a possible disposal need not be a credible alternative. The contribution shows how a compensation principle can turn on the plausibility of the scenario used to justify it.
Must a disputed financial claim delay the transfer of an enterprise? In this brief intervention recorded in the Socialisation Commission’s proceedings published in 1921, Emil Lederer proposes separating the two: deposit the disputed sum as security and let the transfer proceed immediately. He cites Austrian law as a precedent, bringing a concrete procedural solution to the discussion rather than elaborating a general position on municipalisation. The short statement shows how security for a contested claim could, in his view, be reconciled with prompt transfer, though it leaves the legal conditions unspecified.
A municipality’s ability to establish a theatre does not, for Emil Lederer, justify an absolute monopoly over theatrical provision. In this brief intervention, published in the Socialisation Commission’s 1921 proceedings, he separates municipal initiative from exclusive control, then asks exactly what the proposed category of “Schaustellungsunternehmungen” covers. Are exhibitions and trade-fair displays included? Dullo’s recorded reply says they are not. The exchange offers a compact example of policy scrutiny: Lederer tests both the justification for monopoly and the boundaries of the activities to which it might apply.
Die Notwendigkeit eines absoluten Monopols auf diesem Gebiete kann ich nicht anerkennen.
English translation: “I cannot acknowledge the necessity of an absolute monopoly in this field.”
Does municipal ownership expose private businesses to hostile competition from local government? In this brief intervention in the 1921 commission proceedings on municipalization, Emil Lederer points out that municipalities already possess the power to establish competing enterprises. He considers it unlikely that animosity would prevail in a town council, but his sharper argument concerns feasibility: compelling municipalities to acquire and compensate every business in a sector would make socialization impracticable. The contribution makes a precise distinction between powers already available and obligations that legislation might impose, showing why Lederer resists compulsory comprehensive takeover without rejecting compensation itself.
A prospective entrepreneur has bought equipment or rented premises before a new statutory restriction takes effect: how should those commitments count when compensation is determined? In this brief intervention recorded in the Socialisation Commission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer explains a proposed hardship clause that makes room for individual circumstances within general rules. His example turns on demonstrable preparations made while economic activity remained unrestricted, not merely an intention to start a business. When an interjection calls such consideration self-evident, Lederer sharply disagrees. The exchange captures a precise legislative tension: whether protection against inequitable hardship can be assumed or must be expressly written into the rule.
A motor-transport enterprise may serve a town without being a municipal undertaking. In this brief intervention in the Sozialisierungskommission’s deliberations, Emil Lederer uses that distinction to defend municipalities’ option to take transport into public ownership without breaking up wider networks. Shared vehicles, operating resources and repair workshops matter more than the mere fact that a service crosses municipal boundaries. Drawing parallels with regional and through railways, he argues that § 2 already protects enterprises whose predominant purpose extends beyond the municipality. His contribution offers a concrete glimpse of statutory reasoning at work: a general safeguard, he contends, can preserve operational unity while leaving room for different local circumstances in Berlin, Frankfurt or Stuttgart.
Does retaining an existing organization of milk supply also mean operating it as a monopoly? In this brief question recorded in the Sozialisierungs-Kommission proceedings published in 1921, Emil Lederer asks that the institutional consequence be made explicit. His intervention distinguishes continuity of organization from monopoly operation without endorsing or rejecting either. The interest of this small documentary source lies in that precise distinction: it lets readers see what Lederer sought to clarify, while leaving the answer outside the recorded turn.
How can municipalization be subject to legal challenge without becoming trapped in prolonged litigation? In this brief intervention recorded in the Sozialisierungs-Kommission proceedings published in 1921, Emil Lederer proposes limiting administrative review to two judicial instances while allowing challenges from municipal representatives, the affected entrepreneur, and workers’ statutory representatives. His distinctive point is that council members should act as advocates of public welfare, rather than leaving litigation solely to the proprietor whose interests are at stake. The passage offers a concrete glimpse of how procedural rules—who may sue, within what deadline, and with what suspensive effect—could reconcile timely municipal action with scrutiny of its legal conditions.
In this single recorded intervention in the Socialisation Commission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer connects compulsory organisation with municipal power to block the establishment of new enterprises. He proposes an immediate compulsory association as a preparatory measure, rather than an end in itself. The statement offers a precise glimpse of a proposed mechanism for municipal control, while leaving the particular case and its wider justification unstated.
A softened clause is not necessarily an agreed clause. In this brief intervention in the Socialisation Commission’s proceedings, published in 1921, Emil Lederer objects that revised wording on demolition value still fails to resolve his group’s reservations. His proposal is precise: retain the shared general provisions, but record the disputed clause only in the other group’s version. Rather than explaining how demolition value should be calculated, this speaking turn shows Lederer insisting that the commission’s text distinguish common ground from continuing disagreement.