4,099 works, 472 books, 3,268 articles, 356 other works, 3 awaiting classification, 150 years of economic thought. Each one summarized and searchable, with cited passages inside.
Who would command a reorganized coal industry: its directorate or its powerful industrial managers? In this brief intervention recorded in the Socialization Commission’s 1920 proceedings, Emil Lederer answers through institutional design rather than general principle. He argues that elected representation, probably under proportional voting, could give smaller managers seats instead of merely entrenching Germany’s would-be “coal kings.” He also distinguishes approval of the budget from control of operations: financial scrutiny should not permit the Reich Coal Council continually to obstruct the directorate. This compact exchange shows how Lederer sought to reconcile representation and oversight with executive authority strong enough to require general directors to obey orders.
How much freedom should coal administrators have within a system of council oversight? In this brief speaking turn from the 1920 Socialization Commission proceedings, Emil Lederer reads two proposed provisions rather than offering a separate argument. They give the Reich Coal Directorate room to meet unforeseen expenses and appoint managers, while placing it under the Reich Coal Council’s budgetary and procedural authority. Five-year appointments remain subject to removal by a two-thirds council majority; consultation with works committees does not displace executive appointment power. The passage offers a compact view of the proposed machinery of coal administration, showing precisely where managerial discretion was to coexist with oversight.
An electoral power can mark the difference between meaningful participation and institutional weakness. In this brief intervention recorded in the 1920 coal-mining commission proceedings, Emil Lederer objects to removing that power from the Reich Coal Council. He treats election as a guarantee of the industry’s unity as a self-conscious economic body, not merely a procedural detail. Against the directorate’s sweeping powers, the council’s remaining authority would, he argues, be slight. The exchange offers a sharply focused glimpse of how Lederer connects collective identity with the distribution of decision-making power.
In this single-sentence intervention from the 1920 coal-mining socialization commission proceedings, Emil Lederer disputes an electoral reading of a proposal: proportional representation, he argues, cannot be intended because the proposal merely formulates the previous year’s report. The interest lies in his precise interpretive move—using continuity with an earlier document to rule out one possible meaning. This brief record lets readers examine that claim without mistaking it for a developed argument or a statement of the electoral arrangement Lederer preferred.
In this brief speaking turn from the 1920 coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer separates room for negotiation from a principle of membership: every member is intended to be an elected representative. His initial assent is flexible; his statement of principle is explicit. The extract offers a precise glimpse of how he frames elected representation within an arrangement under discussion, without identifying the negotiable detail or setting out the wider institutional design.
In this brief intervention in the coal socialization commission’s proceedings, Emil Lederer suggests wording for a motion on appointment authority. His tentative formulation places appointment by the Reich Chancellor alongside collective participation with a veto for the Coal Council. The interest lies in this precise procedural choice: how to frame executive authority and council involvement within an institutional arrangement. The recorded turn offers a small, concrete instance of Lederer working on the terms of a proposal, rather than setting out a general theory of coal socialization.
Executive independence takes a precise institutional form in this brief commission intervention by Emil Lederer. Reading proposed §§13–15 for the Reich Coal Directorate, he presents an arrangement that gives its chair and deputy extensive powers to act independently while reserving approval of procedural rules and election of the officers to the Reich Coal Council, with governmental confirmation of their election. The interest lies in this compact distribution of authority: readers can see how discretion and oversight were to coexist in a proposed coal-governance institution. The recorded turn supplies the provisions themselves, not Lederer’s personal rationale or a claim to their sole authorship.
Approximately twenty districts, but with exceptions at the centre’s discretion: this brief commission intervention records Emil Lederer reading § 16 of a proposed arrangement for German coal mining. The provision joins geographical continuity to economic coherence as the basis for district boundaries, while allowing the Reich Coal Directorate to place individual establishments directly under its authority. Its interest lies in that precise administrative tension between territorial organization and centralized control. The recorded turn supplies neither Lederer’s rationale nor evidence of his sole authorship; it offers instead a compact piece of the institutional machinery under discussion in the coal-mining socialization proceedings published in 1920.
In this single-sentence intervention recorded in the Socialization Commission’s coal-mining deliberations, Emil Lederer redirects attention to the wording of a provision: division is to follow both local and economic criteria. The documentary interest is precise and limited—a speaker insists on attending to two stated grounds of division, without explaining their relationship or declaring support for the provision. It offers a small instance of textual clarification within a policy discussion, not a developed position on coal mining.
Es heißt hier: örtlich und wirtschaftlich wird eingeteilt!
English translation: “It says here: the division is made on local and economic grounds!”
Public control need not mean direct public operation: that distinction takes concrete form in the draft provisions Emil Lederer reads in this brief recorded contribution to the 1920 Socialization Commission’s coal deliberations. Municipalities would assume responsibility for household fuel while retaining cooperatives or retailers as distributing agencies. A parallel balance governs remuneration: fixed pay, participation in returns and performance bonuses must leave the principal part of income secure at competent average performance. Rather than a separate argument by Lederer, this speaking turn records proposed institutional arrangements. It offers a precise glimpse of how coal socialization could combine public responsibility, commercial intermediaries and incentives constrained by income security.
In this brief recorded turn from the coal-mining socialization commission proceedings, Emil Lederer reads two proposed provisions on managerial authority and employment. Each district would come under a general director; senior managers would hold fixed-term private employment contracts, with fixed pay and a share of net profit benchmarked against private-industry rates. The passage offers a concrete glimpse of how hierarchical management and commercial remuneration could be incorporated into plans for socialization. It records the provisions Lederer presented, not his justification or endorsement of them.
What can an operation’s recorded profit tell us about how well it is managed? In this brief intervention in the 1920 coal-mining deliberations of the German Socialization Commission, Emil Lederer points to accounting prices fixed for individual quality classes. Operations within the same category, he observes, can show higher or lower accounting profits even under equal or poorer management. The turn captures a precise caution: recorded profitability need not provide a straightforward measure of managerial performance.